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NEUTRALITY
The neutral relation is one that is assumed, at the outbreak of
public war, by those states whose relations to the belligerent par-
ties have undergone no change as the result of the establishment
of the new relations of hostility; it matters not what their con-
nections with the contending parties may have been, so soon as an
overt act of hostility has given occasion for the establishment of
a war status between them, all powers who are strangers to the
controversy assume, as a matter of course, the status of neutrals
and become charged with the maintenance of neutral rights and
the corresponding performance of neutral duties. The status so
created contemplates that the neutral shall continue to maintain
the relations of amity that existed with the belligerents at the
outbreak of the war, that only the most necessary restraints shall
be imposed upon his domestic and foreign relations and upon the
commercial activities of his subjects, and that there shall be a
complete immunity from the operations of war in respect to his
territory and territorial waters.
It was impossible for the theory of neutrality to be widely
accepted, or generally practiced, until the principle of state inde-
pendence had achieved substantial recognition among the nations
of continental Europe. So long as an earthly superior was
acknowledged in interstate relations, and so long as the Pope and
Emperor could command a measure of obedience among them,
the status of neutrality, however strongly it might commend
itself to the judgment of those who were charged with the
conduct of international relations, could not prevail against the
authority and influence of the Pope, who dominated in religious
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affairs, and the power of the Emperor, who asserted an equal
supremacy in purely secular concerns. Neutrality, in the modern
sense qf the term, owed its beginning to the success of the North
European states in the struggle for religious freedom and politi-
cal independence which culminated in the Peace of Westphalia
in 1638. With independence came to each state, especially to the
less powerful, the opportunity to decline participation in wars
with which it had no immediate concern and to declare their
neutrality as between the belligerent parties.
Although the termination of the long series of religious wars
gave an opportunity for the development of the Law of Nations
in that regard, the times were so unsettled and the obstacles
encountered were so difficult that the efforts put forth in its behalf
would have met with great discouragement, if not positive failure,
had it not been for the powerful support afforded by England,
whose insular position secured her from invasion and whose
powerful navy protected her widespread commerce from hostile
interruption. Our own statesmen of the last century were no
more deeply concerned at the prospect of becoming involved in
the politics of Europe than were those of Elizabeth's time to hold
aloof from continental affairs during the years preceding the
accession of the Stuarts to the throne.
For nearly two centuries following the close of the Thirty
Years War the great powers were constantly engaged in war,
and the smaller and weaker states, however earnest might be their
desire to refrain from participation, were unable, standing alone,
to secure respect for their neutral rights, or to resort to forcible
measures to make good their neutral obligations. A number of
able and powerful rulers, of whom Louis XIV and Napoleon
were the most conspicuous representatives, were bitterly opposed
to the development of neutrality in any form and contributed
powerfully to oppose it. It should also be said that the considera-
tions which determined one state to remain at peace were fre-
quently not the same as those which actuated other states to the
same end; hence it was that there was not a sufficient community
of interest to bring about the formation of leagues and alliances
with a view to secure belligerent respect for neutral obligations,
of which the Armed Neutralities of the Baltic powers of 178o
and i8oo are examples. As a result it not infrequently happened
that the territory of non-participating states was invaded by the
armies of the belligerent powers, their towns were plundered,
their fields devastated and the burdens of war fell heavily upon
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communities that were without interest in the struggle, and whose
sole desire was to pursue their commercial and economic develop-
ment without abnormal interruption. But years were to pass, even
after their independence had been conceded in international
affairs, before their right to an immunity, as neutrals, from the
operations of war was generally recognized and conceded.
Like many other difficult international situations, neutrality is
easier to define than to practice. The usual definition of a
neutral state, as one which takes no part in an existing war,
maintaining its relations of amity with both belligerents, is one
that is by no means difficult to understand but which, save for
states distant from the theatre of war; is always burdensome and,
at times, entirely difficult to maintain. The theory which lies at
the base of the present practice is that the operations of war,
including its inevitable burdens and sacrifices, should be restricted
to the belligerent parties; that states which are not parties to
its operations should be permitted to continue their normal and
peaceful development, and should be entitled, as of right, to a
complete immunity from its effects. But while neutral states are
generally understood to be exempt from participation, they
become charged, at the outbreak of war, with the performance
of certain duties, and are acknowledged to possess certain rights
which the belligerents are bound to respect and which, if tres-
passed upon or invaded, may be made the subject of diplomatic
protest and may be vindicated, if need be, by resort to armed
force.
With a view to a correct understanding of the situation of
such a state, it will be borne in mind that the maintenance of its
neutral status requires the state to insist upon certain rights and
to fulfill, impartially, as betveen the contending powers, certain
neutral obligations. With the performance of some of these
duties the state itself is specially charged, as the acts are of such
a character that no authority save that of the government is able
to comply with the requirements of the Law of Nations in that
regard; other neutral duties relate to the acts of individuals
which, if injurious to the interests of belligerents, are prevented
by the belligerents themselves, as will presently appear, or by the
adoption by the neutrals of certain regulations which are calcu-
lated to prevent violations of neutral duty by their citizens or
subjects. In theory, at least, the neutral state is indifferent as to
the causes of the war and is equally without concern as to its
results; its chief desire being that its friendly relations shall be
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preserved with the states at war, and that the commercial and
business activities of its subjects shall continue without belligerent
interruption.
In so far as the government of the neutral state is concerned,
its duties and obligations are relatiyely simple and are enforced
without substantial difficulty. It must refrain from assisting
either of the contending powers in its military operations, or from
furnishing aid to either government, even where the assistance
which it is proposed to afford is declared to be equally available
to both; but no specific act or policy can be conceived of which
will be of such equal advantage: hence the rule that the neutral
state may afford no assistance, of any sort, to either belligerent
in the prosecution of his military or naval operations. He may
impose as many restrictions as the situation seems to demand, but
they must bear with equal force upon both of the combatant
parties.
The neutral state is also entitled to a complete immunity from
acts of belligerency, which cannot be committed within its terri-
tory or territorial waters. Land forces may not pass its
boundaries, save to seek asylum from a victorious enemy, and
must be disarmed and interned by the neutral so soon as they
pass the frontier. It is entitled to an equal immunity from the
maritime undertakings of the belligerents. Captures made in
neutral waters must be restored upon the demand of the state
whose neutral obligations have been violated. So strictly is this
rule applied that even small bodies of troops are not permitted
to cross neutral territory, even in time of peace, save under
circumstances of grave emergency and then only in the operation
of an agreement covering all the incidents of the transit.
As all acts of hostility must take place in the territory or
territorial waters of the belligerent parties, or on the high seas,
it follows that hostile expeditions must originate in the same
places. If such an undertaking is prepared in neutral territory,
or originates in a neutral port, the belligerent who suffers from
its activity is injured to precisely the same extent as if it had
been set on foot in a port of the enemy, and such place of origin
becomes, for the time being, hostile territory, and may be so
regarded by the belligerent. It is therefore the first duty of a
neutral state to prevent its ports and waters from being used for
such a purpose. It also follows that a belligerent may not exercise
any form of preventive jurisdiction in neutral territory, and he is
equally forbidden to set up a blockade in front of a neutral port.
NEUTRALITY
A neutral government is also forbidden to furnish money,
troops, or munitions of war, to the combatant states, or to render
military or other service to either or both of them: nor may its
territory be used as a recruiting ground by either power: but it
is neither required nor expected to prevent individuals from going
abroad, individually, to enlist in the military service of the bel-
ligerents.
The rights of neutral citizens stand upon a somewhat different
basis. The states toward which they stand in that relation take
no part in the war, and their right to maintain their ordinary
commercial intercourse with the belligerents, as in time of peace,
has long been conceded, but subject, however, to a number of
important restrictions which will presently be explained; and
these restrictions are imposed, not by their own governments, but
by the belligerents, in order to prevent, or minimize the conse-
quences of such intercourse upon their military operations. The
parties to the great contest now in progress on the continent of
Europe have the right to resort to such measures as will be
calculated to prevent arms and munitions of war from being
introduced into the theatre of war, by persons in the United
States, for example, whose business it is to furnish such articles
to all who desire them, independently of the existence of war.
As many of the articles which go to make up this commerce are
useful in war and are, for that reason, in the highest degree
serviceable to the belligerent parties, they are permitted, in the
exercise of the right of national self-defense, to stop and search
all neutral vessels on the high seas with a view to ascertain
whether they contain what is called contraband of war-that is
articles useful to a belligerent in his military operations. But
this right, like that of blockade, must be exercised upon the
high seas or in the territorial waters of one of the belligerents,
but never in neutral waters; and the neutral ship must submit to
such examination upon penalty of confiscation. The right to
capture and condemn contraband does not apply to the non-
contraband part of the cargo, unless the contraband, in point of
value or quantity, is so great as to give rise to the presumption
that the owner of the ship is aware of the use to which the vessel
is being put, in which case the ship shares the fate of the cargo;
the presumption being that it is being put to illicit use with the
knowledge and consent of its owner.
It is easy to define contraband, but it is far from easy to pre-
pare a list of articles which have the character of contraband to
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such a degree as to warrant their capture and condemnation under
all possible circumstances; the preparation of such lists has been
attempted from time to time, but never with such success as to
warrant their general adoption. The most recent of these efforts
is that contained in the Declaration of London of 19o9, which
contains lists of absolute and conditional contraband, the former
being liable to capture when found on the high seas with a
belligerent destination, the latter becomes liable to capture only
when the character of the cargo and its ultimate destination are
such as to warrant the belief that it is intended for the use of a
belligerent. It is not difficult, however, in the case of a particu-
lar article, or cargo, when its contents and destination are fully
known, to determine its liability to capture and condemnation,
and the judgments of prize courts in that regard are generally
accepted as final.
With a view to mitigate, to some extent, the rigor of the
restrictions thus imposed upon neutral commerce in time of war,
what is known as conditional contraband has been recognized;
that is certain articles are regarded as liable to capture when
destined to a hostile port, or to the land or naval forces of the
enemy, but are not so liable when their ultimate destination is
neutral, or when they are destined to civil, as distinguished from
military use. In all cases the liability to condemnation is deter-
mined by the destination of the goods-for they may have a
hostile destination when the place to which they are consigned
is in a state without a maritime frontier. If the destination is
neutral there is a strong presumption of innocence, and the
burden of proving the contrary rests upon the captor; otherwise,
however, where the destination is hostile, even though the cargo
be destined to an intermediate neutral port, with a view to its
transhipment to some other form of marine transportation for
the residue of the transit.
It will thus appear that the right of search, an extremely
onerous one in so far as neutrals are concerned, may be exercised
upon a neutral merchant ship at any point upon its voyage,
either upon the high seas or in the territorial waters of a bellig-
erent. Efforts were put forth at the London Conference of 19o9
to relieve this situation by a clause restricting its exercise to
the area of operations of a blockading belligerent; the right of
convoy was also restored in the operation of a requirement that
a fleet of merchantmen, if accompanied by a public armed vessel
of the same nationality, are exempt from visitation and search.
NEUTRALITY
Whether the remedies so provided will operate efficiently to
relieve neutral shipping from the burdens to which it is now sub-
jected can only be determined after the rules have been given the
test of practical experience in time of public war.
Questions respecting the validity of maritime captures are
determined by tribunals of the captor state which, on account of
the jurisdiction exercised by them, are called "prize courts." One
of the most important of the stipulations of the Convention of
The Hague of 19o7 provided for prize courts of appeal, to which
the decisions of the court having original jurisdiction in prize
cases may be carried with a view to a judicial review.
The Law of Nations places another instrumentality in the hands
of belligerents with a view to prevent neutral interference with
their military operations. The right to seize contraband, although
a most important one to belligerents, is not sufficient, standing
alone, to enable them to prevent neutral assistance from reaching
the enemy; a more efficient agency for that purpose is found in
the right of blockade. The seizure of contraband is restricted
to articles that are primarily useful to a belligerent in his military
operations, and such seizures can only be made on the high seas
or in the territorial waters of a belligerent. The right of blockade
goes further than this and, if fully and efficiently exercised, is
calculated to prevent all neutral commerce with the ports and
coasts of the enemy. A blockade is established by the stationing
of war vessels opposite the ports of the enemy with a view to
preclude the entrance or exit of all neutral commercial vessels; to
ensure thoroughness the naval blockade may be supplemented by
the erection of shore batteries, commanding the entrances to the
blockaded port. When such an obstruction has been regularly
proclaimed and established, all craft that attempt to enter or leave
the blockaded port are liable to capture, and the right of -search
may be exercised at any place between the port of departure and
the port which is undergoing blockade; attempts to violate the
blockade by egress may be pursued to the territorial waters of the
ship's destination. The penalty for an attempted breach of
blockade are extremely severe and include the forfeiture of both
ship and cargo.
Another form of unneutral service, which is becoming more fre-
quent, perhaps, than it was in the early years of the Nineteenth
Century, is that of the neutral carriage of the enemy's troops and
dispatches. These acts are so clearly inconsistent with neutral
duty as to warrant condemnation in all cases in which the char-
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acter of the passengers is known to the carrier, or to a case in
which such knowledge may be fairly presumed from the facts.
A neutral may also assist one belligerent to the detriment of the
other by the conveyance of dispatches, but the circumstances must
be such as to disclose an intent to render unneutral service, as
their conveyance in the ordinary course of the mails, or by tele-
graph or cable lines, which are open to the public generally, is
not properly the subject of belligerent complaint. This matter,
which has given occasion for frequent misunderstanding in the
past, has recently been made the subject of efficient but reasonable
regulation in The Hague Conventions of 19o7. Cables connect-
ing neutral territories may not be cut under any circumstances;
if the lines connect neutral and belligerent territories, they may be
cut by a belligerent where the line enters hostile territory.
For more than a century neutral rights and duties were deter-
mined by the generally accepted rules of international law, and
received no conventional support until the adoption of the Declara-
tion of Paris in 1856 established the well known rules governing
blockades and the liability of neutral goods to capture at sea.
The Peace Conference of 1907 at The Hague left little to be
done in the way of making clear the rights and duties of neutral
states and individuals and in providing remedies for their viola-
tion. The enforcement of neutral rights has always been easy
to a state powerful enough to command respect for its neutral
obligations, independently of treaty stipulations; not so, however,
with powers of the second class, whose position in time of
war is habitually neutral and who are greatly aided in their efforts
to maintain that status by the plain and unmistakable require-
ments of treaty stipulations. England, Germany or the United
States may demand of a belligerent complete respect for their
neutral rights, but that this is not true of a less powerful state is
indicated by the case of Belgium which found, at the outbreak of
the existing war, that the explicit provisions of a solemn inter-
national guarantee did not avail to secure the neutrality of her
territory.
The humane requirements of these undertakings had received
the support of the entire civilized world, and were confidently
relied upon to relieve the Belgian government from embarrass-
ment whenever the existence of public war menaced its attitude
of friendliness to the belligerent powers. The neutrality of
Belgium and Switzerland, which had been made the subject of
special guarantees, was regarded as determining the military
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policy of those states in their relations with their neighbors.
More than this, it was believed that the mere existence of these
agreements would operate, not only to restrict military operations
to belligerent territory, but would furnish a striking example for
the guidance of other states under similar circumstances. But
Switzerland has been compelled to resort to an extensive and
costly mobilization of its military forces, in order to secure respect
for its territory, while Belgium has been occupied by the forces of
one belligerent and has become the theatre of one of the greatest
and most destructive wars of modem times, and now finds itself
compelled to bear the heavy burdens and sacrifices of a war in
which it was its sole desire to refrain from participation.
It has been seen that the case of the second class powers was
taken into serious consideration by the Second Peace Conference
at The Hague, which afforded them substantial conventional sup-
port in their efforts to maintain their neutral obligations during
the existence of a general European war. Two of these conven-
tions have for their especial purpose to define the rights and duties
of neutral states and individuals in time of public war. These
undertakings cover substantially the entire field of neutral obliga-
tion and are especially clear in respect to the character and extent
of the control which governments must exercise over the activities
of their subjects. In some respects this control must be so
extensive as to amount to a complete prohibition as to acts com-
mitted in neutral territory, over which, from the circumstances
of the case, the belligerent is not permitted to exercise control.
Such are the clauses in the matter of recruiting and the fitting
out or augmenting of maritime expeditions, the sale of war
vessels, including torpedo craft, mine planters and the like, whose
character and purpose are obvious from their special construction.
As these undertakings are carried on in neutral territory, over
which the belligerents are not permitted to exercise any form of
police jurisdiction or administrative control, and as they emerge
from a neutral port as hostile expeditions, ready to operate as
such, the neutral government is bound to prohibit their construc-
tion and to prevent their departure. Of these acts of unneutral
service we have examples in the construction of the Alabama and
other Confederate privateers in the ports and territorial waters
of Great Britain. As to other acts of individuals, such as the
carrying of contraband, or the attempt to enter blockaded ports,
the neutral governments are wholly without responsibility, as the
Law of Nations clothes the belligerent who suffers from their
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operations with a sufficient power to prevent them. Further than
this in support of neutrality international law cannot safely go
without giving its sanction to an amount of interference in the
internal administration of neutral states which would be found
intolerable, even in time of war.
No duty with which a sovereign state is charged is more vitally
important to the world's welfare than that of maintaining its
neutrality as between the contending powers in time of war. If
that duty is strictly and efficiently performed, the inevitable result
will be to restrict its operations to the military forces of the
contending powers, to confine them to belligerent territory and
thus to ensure the peaceful development of the powers which
refrain from participation. But such a fortunate result cannot be
expected if a powerful belligerent, equally bound to respect the
rules of international law, which are supported by the solemn
obligations of treaties, seizes the occasion, in a time of profound
peace, not only to repudiate their essential requirements, but to
convert the guaranteed territory of a neutral into the theatre of
a cruel and sanguinary war.
The states of the civilized world, in the face of great difficulties,
have steadily favored the development of the neutral theory and
cannot without serious concern see the work of years thus lightly
repudiated and set aside, even though the violation of neutral
obligation is said fo be based upon the right of national self-
defense. The doctrine of self-defense is best served by a state
which, at the outbreak of war, strictly observes the neutral rights
of its neighbors and demands of them an equally rigid observance
of their neutral obligations. It is impossible to conceive of an
exercise of that important right which can only be given effect
by a disregard of treaty stipulations which were deliberately
entered into with a view to prevent such a violation of inter-
national peace as is now in progress on the continent of Europe.
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